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Abstract In this paper, we apply dynamic tracking games to macroeconomic
policy making in a monetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear two-country
macroeconomic model of a monetary union for analyzing the interactions between
two fiscal (governments: ‘‘core’’ and ‘‘periphery’’) and one monetary (central bank)
policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers.
Using the OPTGAME algorithm, we calculate numerical solutions for cooperative
(Pareto optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We show how the
policy makers react to adverse demand shocks. We investigate the consequences of
three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies controlled by independent governments
(the present situation), centralized fiscal policy (a fiscal union) with an independent
central bank (pure fiscal union), and a fully centralized monetary and fiscal union.
For the latter two scenarios, we demonstrate the importance of different assumptions
about the joint objective function corresponding to different weights for the two
governments in the design of the common fiscal policy. We show that a fiscal union
with weights corresponding to the number of states in each of the blocs gives better
results than non-cooperative policy making. When one bloc dominates the fiscal
union, decentralized policies yield lower overall losses than the pure fiscal union
and the monetary and fiscal union.
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The Great Recession, the financial and economic crisis which started in the United
States and spread over most of the world, was the most severe crisis since the Great
Depression of the 1930s. While it was over by 2010 in most parts of the world, Europe
was hit in a particularly hard way and is still struggling with its consequences. This is
due to the specific problems of the European Economic and Monetary Union, in
particular the Euro Area. Most observers blame the political architecture of the
monetary union for this prolonged crisis. It has at least two dimensions: an asymmetry
of competitiveness and an asymmetry of sovereign debt within the union. Both
phenomena were acerbated by the initial period of the monetary union, with its
equalized interest and inflation rates in spite of these asymmetries and with its
consequently distorted price signals. This led to further drifting apart during the Great
Recession, when these distortions were noticed by the financial markets. The Greek
Crisis is the most obvious manifestation of this development, but several other
countries (most explicitly those on the so-called periphery of the union) suffered (and
are partly still suffering) from similar problems to Greece.
In this paper we concentrate on the sovereign debt crisis and its macroeconomic
consequences. Many observers think that the piling up of public debt in countries
like Greece calls for austerity measures to secure the solvency of their governments.
However, during periods of low or even negative growth such a policy conflicts with
the stabilization function of fiscal policy, which calls for an expansionary policy
stance especially in those countries with relatively high public debt. Although there
are different estimates about the extent of this trade-off between fiscal prudence and
stability requirements on the one hand and stabilization goals for output and
employment on the other, there is a lot of evidence that in the short run, debt
reductions by restrictive government expenditure and tax policies have adverse
effects on aggregate demand and unemployment. Several ways out of this
unfortunate situation have been proposed by politicians and economists, especially
in the context of the Greek Crisis. Some proposals call for debt reductions through
transfers from the countries with sound finances in order to support those countries
which are threatened by government insolvency. This may temporarily prevent state
bankruptcy in the overindebted countries, but the medium and long run
consequences are less clear, and the acceptance of such transfers by taxpayers in
the donating countries is certainly limited, in spite of appeals to European solidarity.
In a previous paper (Neck and Blueschke 2014), we have shown in a dynamic game
model of a monetary union that such a ‘‘haircut’’ for indebted countries may lead to
disadvantages, not only for the donors but also for the receiving countries due to
their subsequent exclusion from financial markets and increased risk premiums for
the interest on their public debt. The development of Greece since the first debt
relief seems to corroborate this prediction.
Another remedy for the asymmetry of the government debt situation proposed by
many European policy makers is the centralization of fiscal policies in the Euro
Area, from a mechanism enforcing prudent government debt policies to the
institution of a fiscal union with additional competences for the union-wide
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institutions in fiscal matters. Notwithstanding the political obstacles to such a
centralizing institutional move, it is of obvious interest to know whether its
economic consequences will be advantageous or not. This question will be
examined in the present paper. Due to the complexity of the decision mechanisms in
the Euro Area, we can only provide a very partial answer. First, we concentrate on
macroeconomic effects, abstracting from possible allocative and distributive
consequences and from political problems such a massive restriction of national
decision-making bodies would possibly create. Moreover, we use a fairly simple
model with only two countries (or blocs) in the monetary union to deal with the
asymmetry between high and low government debt countries. Policy conclusions
must therefore be drawn with a lot of caution.
On the other hand, by using a dynamic policy game approach we can capture
some of the strategic interactions between high and low public debt countries and
between monetary and fiscal policy makers which are often neglected in the
literature on the macroeconomics of a monetary union. To do so, we introduce a
model of a monetary union with three decision makers: two governments (blocs),
named core (bloc 1) and periphery (bloc 2), which differ with respect to their initial
debt level and their preferences in the debt-output/employment trade-off, and a
central bank responsible for monetary policy in the entire union. While the central
bank cares about price stability and other targets in the whole union, the
governments are assumed to be only interested in their national targets (and may
have preferences about the Phillips curve trade-off which differ from those of the
central bank). We calibrate the model so as to mirror some macroeconomic aspects
of the Euro Area and calculate (approximate) optimal policies for these policy
makers under different assumptions about fiscal-monetary policy interactions. A
non-cooperative scenario is compared to several versions of a ‘‘pure fiscal union’’
(without coordination with the central bank) and a ‘‘complete monetary and fiscal
union’’ where all policy makers cooperate. One result is that a higher degree of
centralization in the institutional setting of the monetary union may but need not
necessarily yield better results than non-cooperative decentralized policy making.
2 The dynamic game framework
We consider nonlinear dynamic games in discrete time given in tracking form. The
players aim at minimizing quadratic deviations of the equilibrium or optimal values














Litðxt; u1t ; . . .; uNt Þ; i ¼ 1; . . .;N; ð1Þ
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Litðxt; u1t ; . . .; uNt Þ ¼
1
2
½Xt  ~Xit 0Xit½Xt  ~Xit : ð2Þ
The parameter N denotes the number of players (decision makers). T is the finite
terminal period of the planning horizon. Xt is an aggregated vector
Xt ¼ ½xt u1t u2t . . . uNt 0; ð3Þ
consisting of an (nx  1) vector of state variables and N (ni  1) vectors of control
variables. The desired levels of the state and the control variables enter (1)–(2) via
the terms with a tilde:
~Xit ¼ ½~xit ~ui1t ~ui2t . . . ~uiNt 0: ð4Þ
Finally, (2) contains a penalty matrix Xit weighting the deviations of states and
controls from their desired levels at any period t.
The dynamic system constraining the choices of the decision makers is given in
state-space form by a first-order system of nonlinear difference equations:
xt ¼ f ðxt1; xt; u1t ; . . .; uNt ; ztÞ; x0 ¼ x0: ð5Þ
x0 contains the initial values of the states, zt contains non-controlled exogenous
variables. Equations (1), (2) and (5) define a nonlinear dynamic tracking game
problem, which can be solved for different solution concepts. In order to solve this
game we use the OPTGAME algorithm as described in Blueschke et al. (2013).
3 The MUMOD1 model
We use a dynamic macroeconomic model consisting of two countries (or two blocs
of countries) with a common central bank. This model is called MUMOD1 and is
essentially the same as the one introduced in Neck and Blueschke (2014). For a
similar framework in continuous time, see Aarle et al. (2002). The model is
calibrated so as to deal with the problem of public debt targeting in a situation that
resembles the one currently prevailing in the European Union.
The model is formulated in terms of deviations from a long-run growth path and
includes three decision makers. The common central bank decides on the prime rate
REt, a nominal rate of interest under its direct control. The national governments
decide on fiscal policy where git denotes country i’s ði ¼ 1; 2Þ real fiscal surplus (or,
if negative, its fiscal deficit), measured in relation to real GDP.
The model consists of the following equations:
yit ¼ diðpjt  pitÞ  cðrit  hÞ þ qiyjt
 bipit þ jiyi;t1  gigit þ zdit;
ð6Þ
rit ¼ Iit  peit; ð7Þ
Iit ¼ REt  kigit þ viDit; ð8Þ
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pit ¼ peit þ niyit; ð9Þ
peit ¼ eipi;t1 þ ð1 eiÞpei;t1; e 2 ½0; 1; ð10Þ
yEt ¼ xy1t þ ð1 xÞy2t; x 2 ½0; 1; ð11Þ
pEt ¼ xp1t þ ð1 xÞp2t; x 2 ½0; 1; ð12Þ







yit Real output (deviation from natural output)
pit Inflation rate
rit Real interest rate
git Real fiscal surplus
Iit Nominal interest rate
peit Expected inflation rate
REt Prime rate
Dit Real government debt
Bit Interest rate on public debt
The goods markets are modelled for each country i by the short-run income-
expenditure equilibrium relation (IS curve) (6). The natural real rate of output
growth, h 2 ½0; 1, is assumed to be equal to the natural real rate of interest. The
current real rate of interest rit is given by Eq. (7). The nominal rate of interest Iit is
given by Eq. (8), where ki and vi (assumed to be positive) are risk premiums for
country i’s fiscal deficit and public debt level.
The inflation rates for each country pit are determined in Eq. (9) according to an
expectations-augmented Phillips curve. peit denotes the rate of inflation expected to
prevail during time period t, which is formed according to the hypothesis of
adaptive expectations at (the end of) time period t  1 (Eq. 10). ei 2 ½0; 1 are
positive parameters determining the speed of adjustment of expected to actual
inflation. The average values of output and inflation in the monetary union are given
by Eqs. (11) and (12), where parameter x expresses the weight of country 1 in the
economy of the whole monetary union as defined by its output level.
The government budget constraint is given as Eq. (13) for real government debt
Dit (measured in relation to GDP). The interest rate on public debt (on bonds) is
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denoted by BIit, which assumes an average government bond maturity of 6 years, as
estimated in Krause and Moyen (2013).
The parameters of the model are specified for a slightly asymmetric monetary
union. Here an attempt has been made to calibrate the model parameters so as to fit
for the Euro Area (EA). The data used for calibration include average economic
indicators for the (now) 19 countries from EUROSTAT up to the year 2007 (pre-
crisis state). Mainly based on their public finance situation, the EA is divided into
two blocs: a ‘‘core’’ (country or bloc 1) and a ‘‘periphery’’ (country or bloc 2). The
first bloc includes twelve EA countries (Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, and Slovakia)
with a more solid fiscal situation and inflation performance. This bloc has a weight
of 60 % in the entire economy of the monetary union. The second bloc has a weight
of 40 % in the economy of the union; in the EA, it consists of seven countries with
higher public debt and/or deficits and higher interest and inflation rates on average
(Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain). The weights
correspond to their respective shares in EA real GDP (in 2007). For the other
parameters of the model, we use values in accordance with econometric studies and
plausibility considerations (see Tables 1, 2).
Using the MUMOD1 model we consider an intertemporal nonlinear game in
tracking form. The individual objective functions of the national governments



















fapEðpEt  ~pEtÞ2 þ ayEðyEt  ~yEtÞ2 þ aEðREt  ~REtÞ2g ð16Þ
where all a are weights of state variables representing their relative importance to
the relevant policy maker (see Table 3). A tilde denotes the desired values of the
variable concerned (Table 4).
The joint objective function for calculating the cooperative Pareto-optimal
solution is given by the weighted sum of the three objective functions:
Table 1 Initial values of the two-country monetary union
yi;0 pi;0 pei;0 Ii;0 D1;0 D2;0 RE;0 g1;0 g2;0
0 2.5 2.5 3 60 80 3 -2 -4
Table 2 Parameter values for an asymmetric monetary union, i ¼ 1; 2
T h x di; gi; ei bi; ci;qi;ji; ki ni vi li;lE
30 3 0.6 0.5 0.25 0.1 0.0125 0.333
338 Empirica (2016) 43:333–347
123
J ¼ l1J1 þ l2J2 þ lEJE; ðl1 þ l2 þ l3 ¼ 1Þ: ð17Þ
The dynamic system is given in state-space form by the MUMOD1 model as
presented in Eqs. (6) to (14). Equations (15), (16) and the dynamic system (6)–(14)
define a nonlinear dynamic tracking game problem which can be solved for different
solution concepts. Using the OPTGAME3 algorithm (see Blueschke et al. 2013) we
solve this dynamic tracking game numerically and analyze the effects of different
shocks acting on the system. In this study we consider demand-side shocks in the
goods markets as represented by the variables (Table 5) zdit. These demand shocks
represent both the negative effects of the 2007–2010 economic crisis affecting the
whole monetary union and the European sovereign debt crisis affecting the second
bloc only.
4 Results of the baseline solution
In this study we investigate the effects of a centralized fiscal policy, which can be
interpreted as the working of a fiscal union. To this end we compare the
performance of the players based on three scenarios: Noncoop (the non-cooperative
feedback Nash game with three independent players), Fiscalun (a Nash game with
two players: fiscal union vs. central bank), and Monfiscun (the cooperative Pareto
solution where all players act in a coordinated way as one player). First, we present
the results of a baseline scenario in which the weights of the fiscal union members
correspond to real weights inside the EA. As the weighting criteria we assume that
each bloc is assigned one voice, which results in a core/periphery relation of
63–37 %. After that we test two special cases of asymmetric fiscal unions where one
member of the fiscal union gets a higher weight (90–10 and 10–90 %). For this
Table 3 Weights of the variables in the objective functions
ayi; agi apE ayE ; api aD1 aD2 aRE
1 2 0.5 0.01 0.0001 2.5
Table 4 Target values for the asymmetric monetary union
~D1t ~D2t ~pit ~pEt ~yit ~yEt ~git ~REt
60 80&60 2 2 0 0 0 3
Table 5 Negative demand shocks in the asymmetric monetary union
t 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ...
zd1t -1 -6 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
zd2t -1 -6 -1 -3 -4 -3 -1 0 0 0
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baseline solution, in this section we present the results of the three scenarios
(Noncoop, Fiscalun, and Monfiscun).
Figure 1 shows the time paths of the control variables in this experiment. Figure 2
shows the results for the politically most relevant state variables.
Figure 1 shows that both monetary and fiscal policies react to the negative
demand shock in an expansionary and hence countercyclical manner, especially
during the periods (to be interpreted as years) of the original Great Recession-like
shock. The reaction to the asymmetric part of the shock (modeling the sovereign
debt crisis) is stronger in the periphery, as expected. Note that fiscal policies return
rather quickly to the long-run desired level of balanced budgets (more so in the core
than in the periphery), and monetary policy keeps interest rates low over an
extended period. This shows some similarity with the interest rate policy of the
European Central Bank, although the rather aggressive expansionary policy stance
of the ECB is not an outcome of the game scenarios under consideration. While the
core government follows nearly the same fiscal policy in the three versions (non-
cooperative, fiscal union, monetary and fiscal union) of this baseline scenario, the
non-cooperative solution for the periphery’s fiscal policy is less expansionary than
in the versions with partial and full cooperation. The central bank is considerably
more active (in the expansionary direction) in the full monetary and fiscal union
than in the other two games.
Comparing the resulting outcomes of these different games reflecting institu-
tional differences, it is remarkable that the effects on output are very similar for all
three games. This is an indication of the low effectiveness of fiscal policies for real
sector variables, a result we have already obtained in previous simulations with the
same model in spite of its more Keynesian than monetarist features. The











































Fig. 1 Control variables [prime rate (REt) and fiscal surplus (git)] in the baseline scenario (63-37)
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development of the inflation rates differs more, with the active central bank (and,
more generally, cooperation) avoiding deflationary tendencies (although not real
deflation as the inflation rate always remains positive). The most pronounced
differences occur between the three games in the development of government debt,
especially in the periphery bloc, where the increase in debt is lowest in the fully
cooperative monetary and fiscal union and highest in the pure fiscal union. This
latter result is only partly driven by the low weight the government of the periphery
attaches to its debt goal; another reason is the more expansionary monetary policy
which prevents adverse real interest effects on government debt.
5 Results for asymmetric Fiscal unions
In this section we present the results for two special cases of an asymmetric fiscal
union. In these cases one member of the fiscal union is accorded significantly
greater importance: core to periphery, 90–10 and 10–90 %, respectively. We may
call these scenarios, somewhat ironically, the ‘‘Scha¨uble fiscal union’’ and the





























































































Fig. 2 State variables [output (yit), inflation (pit) and public debt (Dit)] in the baseline scenario (63-37)
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‘‘Varoufakis fiscal union’’ respectively to express the dominance of the core on the
one hand and the periphery on the other.
5.1 The 90-10 Scenario (Core Dominance)
Figure 3 shows the time paths of the control variables in this experiment while
Fig. 4 shows the results for the state variables. In general, the relative effects of the
increased weight given to the core government in the fiscal union and in the
monetary and fiscal union (the non-cooperative solution remains the same, of
course) leads to a less expansionary monetary policy than in the baseline solution, a
less expansionary fiscal policy by the core government, and a considerably more
expansionary fiscal policy by the periphery (compare Figs. 1, 3). The reason for this
is the ability of the more austerity-prone core government to implement its preferred
course of actions (less expansion) and the resulting need for the expansion-prone
periphery to combat the slump by creating higher budget deficits.
This policy mix in the two games with (partial or full) cooperation results in
developments in the core which are quite similar to those in the baseline solution
(compare the left columns of Figs. 2, 4) but cause a more expansionary development
in the periphery: output in both cooperation games is higher, and so is government
debt. However, the size of the effect of the more expansionary fiscal policy of the
periphery is much larger for government debt than for output. Altogether, the
periphery suffers from its low weight in the cooperative agreements assumed for the
pure fiscal and the monetary and fiscal union: it pays a high price in terms of
(actually not sustainable) increased debt for only modest additional output.







































Fig. 3 Control variables [prime rate (REt) and fiscal surplus (git)] in the 90-10 scenario
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Fig. 4 State variables [output (yit), inflation (pit) and public debt (Dit)] in the 90-10 scenario








































Fig. 5 Control variables [prime rate (REt) and fiscal surplus (git)] in the 10-90 scenario
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5.2 The 10-90 Scenario (Periphery Dominance)
Figure 5 shows the time paths of the control variables in this experiment while
Fig. 6 shows the results for the state variables. The scenario with the dominance of
the periphery calls for stronger expansionary reactions by all policy makers to the
second (sovereign debt) phase of the shock due to the periphery (which is the only
player directly affected by it) having a stronger weight in the cooperative
agreements. The most visible effect of the low weight of the core is, however, its
considerably more expansionary fiscal policy. As the weak partner in such a fiscal
union (with or without the cooperation of the central bank) the core has to shoulder
the burden of dealing with the shock to a larger extent than in the two pervious
scenarios (Fig. 5 as compared to Figs. 1, 3).
As has to be expected from this policy mix in the games with cooperation, the
effects on the periphery are small compared to the baseline scenario, and the effects
on the core are stronger. The output-debt trade-off in the pure fiscal union manifests
itself in developments of output and public debt in the periphery which are very
close to those in the non-cooperative solution. Now the core has to bear the burden
of stabilization policy in the cooperative solutions by accepting higher government































































































Fig. 6 State variables [output (yit), inflation (pit) and public debt (Dit)] in the 10-90 scenario
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debt over the entire period, with only small gain in terms of higher output. Note that
this reinforces the observation that expansionary fiscal policy is not very effective at
fulfilling the task of stabilizing output (and employment, although this variable is
not explicitly present in our model).
6 Does cooperation pay?
How likely is the advent of an institutional change towards a fiscal union, with or
without the cooperation of the central bank? This depends on the possible gains
from such a change. In the simplified framework of our model, we can guess an
answer from the (equilibrium and optimal) values of the objective functions of the
three players under alternative scenarios and for the different types of games.
Table 6 shows these values of the individual objective functions and of the fiscal
union coalitions (without and with the central bank). Since these are loss functions
to be minimized, low numbers are better than large ones. The central bank is
abbreviated by ‘‘CB’’. The last column can be interpreted as the overall
macroeconomic costs of each game. As has to be expected, the ‘‘grand coalition’’
(monetary and fiscal union) in the baseline scenario is better than the ‘‘small
coalition’’ (pure fiscal union), which in turn is better than non-cooperation.
However, and this is unexpected, this is not true for the asymmetric unions. The two
pure fiscal union games produce the worst outcomes (highest costs), and the non-
cooperative solution is even better than the fully cooperative solution when one
player dominates in the latter. As the numbers of the individual losses reveal, this is
due to the high losses the weaker player incurs in the relevant cooperative game.
From a normative point of view we have to conclude from a comparison of the
outcomes, therefore, that the desirability of a fiscal union (in this model) depends
strongly on the distribution of power within the fiscal policy. An unequal
distribution, where one member of the union has to bear most of the costs, will be
disadvantageous for the entire cooperative outcome.
Table 6 Objective function values of the MUMOD1 based dynamic game
Scenario/player CB Core (C1) Periphery (C2) C1 ? C2 CB ? C1 ? C2
Noncoop 41.41 52.55 66.62 119.17 160.58
Fiscalun_baseline 31.86 49.41 73.08 122.49 154.35
Monfiscun_baseline 43.26 28.54 58.08 86.62 129.88
Fiscalun_90-10 13.05 36.45 171.27 207.72 220.76
Monfiscun_90-10 24.75 20.93 146.66 167.59 192.35
Fiscalun_10-90 27.08 121.00 54.74 175.75 202.82
Monfiscun_10-90 37.66 111.07 37.36 148.43 186.09
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7 Conclusions and outlook
In this paper, we presented an application of dynamic tracking games to a monetary
union. We used a small stylized nonlinear two-country macroeconomic model of a
monetary union for analyzing the interactions between two fiscal (governments:
‘‘core’’ and ‘‘periphery’’) and one monetary (common central bank) policy makers,
assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the
OPTGAME algorithm, we calculated numerical solutions for cooperative (Pareto
optimal) and non-cooperative games (feedback Nash). We showed how the policy
makers react to demand shocks according to these solution concepts. To this end we
introduced a negative asymmetric demand side shock aimed at describing the
macroeconomic dynamics within a monetary union in a situation similar to the
economic crisis (2007–2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (since 2010) in Europe.
We investigated the consequences of three scenarios: decentralized fiscal policies
controlled by independent governments (the present situation), centralized fiscal
policy (a fiscal union) with an independent central bank (pure fiscal union), and a
fully centralized fiscal and monetary union. For the latter two scenarios, we
investigated the effects of different assumptions about the joint objective function
corresponding to different weights for the two governments in the bargaining
process assumed to precede the design of the common fiscal policy. We showed the
importance of these weights and, hence, of the regulations contained in the fiscal
constitution of the union for the macroeconomic outcomes of the resulting games in
terms of the sustainability of fiscal policies and the main objective variables of the
policy makers. We showed that a fiscal union with weights corresponding to the
number of states in the respective bloc gave better results (in terms of the overall
objective function) than non-cooperative decentralized policy making, especially if
the fiscal union cooperates with monetary policy by the joint central bank. When
one bloc dominates the fiscal union, however, decentralized policies yield lower
overall losses than the pure fiscal union and the monetary and fiscal union.
Applying these results to the current situation in the Euro Area must be done very
cautiously. The model used is relatively simple and does not contain some important
macroeconomic relations such as, for instance, differences in competitiveness
between the blocs. Forward-looking expectations could possibly imply another
modification to the results. Differences within the blocs are neglected, which would
give rise to additional strategic possibilities such as coalitions between several
countries against the rest. The model aims at short-run effects only and does not
consider the long-run growth effects of different policy regimes. These and other
extensions to the framework seem worthwhile examining and will be subjects for
further research. We think, however, that even within the simple framework
considered here, the usefulness of the dynamic game approach has been
demonstrated for the analysis of macroeconomic policy making in a monetary
union.
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